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Abstract
We study two tractable random non-forced choice models that explain behavioural patterns
suggesting that the choice-deferral outside option is often selected when people find it hard to
decide between the market alternatives available to them, even when these are few and desirable.
The decision-conflict logit extends the logit model with an outside option by assigning a menu-
dependent value to that option. This value captures the degree of complexity/decision difficulty
at the relevant menu and allows for the choice probability of the outside option to either increase
or decrease when the menu is expanded, depending on how many as well as how attractive options
are added to it. The multicriteria logit is a special case of this model and introduces multiple
utility functions that jointly predict behaviour in a multiplicative-logit way. Every multicriteria
logit admits a simple discrete-choice formulation.
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1 Introduction
It is a well-established fact that people often opt for the choice-delay outside option when
they find it hard to compare the active-choice alternatives available to them, even when
each of these alternatives is individually considered “good enough” to be chosen (Tversky
and Shafir, 1992; Anderson, 2003; Bhatia and Mullett, 2016). Real-world examples of such
behaviour include:
1. Employees who operated within an “active decision” pension-savings environment and
did not sign up for one of the plans that were available to them within, say, a day, week
or month of first notice, possibly even opting for indefinite non-enrolment. As Carroll
et al. (2009) noted, such “an active decision mechanism compels agents to struggle with
a potentially time-consuming decision”.
2. An online retailer’s uniquely identifiable website visitors who, by the end of their visit,
had purchased none of the products previously presented to them, possibly due to
“conflicts, ambivalence and hesitation” (Huang, Korfiatis, and Chang, 2018).
3. Patients who, instead of choosing “immediately” one of the active treatments that were
recommended to them against a medical condition, delayed making such a choice (often
at a health cost), due to “facing a treatment dilemma” (Knops et al., 2013).
4. Doctors who were willing to prescribe the single available drug to treat a medical
condition but were not prepared to prescribe anything when they had to decide from
the expanded set that contained one more drug. As noted by Redelmeier and Shafir
(1995), “(a)pparently, the difficulty in deciding between the two medications led some
physicians to recommend not starting either”.
An analyst might be interested in understanding the preferences of the average employee,
consumer, patient or doctor in such datasets at the time when the decision problem was first
presented to them. In line with common practice in the discrete-choice literature, the ana-
lyst’s starting point may be to define the grand choice set as the collection of all alternatives
and the outside option. Then, following Luce (1959), she might check if there is some utility
function on this expanded set that explains the data by means of the standard logit formula.
If Luce’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom is violated, she would conclude
that such an exact representation is impossible; and if these violations are severe, estimation
via logit regression (McFadden, 1973) would not provide a good fit either. A question that
arises naturally is whether in such cases one can do better with some more general but still
disciplined model that would impose the logit assumptions only on market alternatives that
correspond to the agents’ active choices, while at the same time allowing for the outside
option to be chosen.
We answer this question affirmatively and show that if IIA is satisfied by the choice
probabilities of market alternatives, then such data may admit two novel and tractable rep-
resentations that allow for recovering a considerable amount of information about consumer
indecisiveness and the generally incomplete preferences of the average decision maker at
the time of first presentation. In line with the above examples, and depending also on the
richness of the available data (e.g. do they also include response times) and the analyst’s
objective (e.g. are they analyzing only the final active choices or are they also interested in
understanding any initial decision difficulties), choosing the outside option might be defined,
for example, either as the act of choosing no market alternative from the menu in question
or as an “excessive” delay in choosing such an alternative. The latter definition may be
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particularly relevant if additional information about the alternatives has been received by
the agent in the interim stage. Under this flexible interpretation, these models are applicable
in a variety of datasets that may originate in the market, field or lab.
Formally, upon letting the grand choice set X comprise only market alternatives, we show
that the first piece of novel preference-relevant information in such cases can be revealed from
the existence of a (pseudo-)utility function u that is defined on X and of a decision complexity
function D that is defined on the set of all menus that can be derived from X, in such a way
that for every menu A ⊆ X and market alternative a ∈ A, the choice probability of a at A
when the opt-out option o 6∈ X is also feasible is given by
ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) = u(a)∑
b∈A
u(b) +D(A)
, (1)
where D is zero at singleton menus and strictly positive otherwise, and the pair (u,D) is
unique up to a common positive linear transformation. We will refer to (1) as the decision-
conflict logit model. Like the Luce model with an outside option, market alternatives in
(1) are assigned menu-independent (pseudo-)utility values. Unlike that model, the utility
of the outside option is menu-dependent and captured by the value of D at the relevant
menu. Thus, the appeal of the outside option at a menu is strictly increasing in decision
complexity. Importantly, however, the complexity function D is not increasing with menu
expansion in general. This is consistent with evidence and intuition suggesting that adding
alternatives to a menu may or may not increase decision difficulty and the appeal of delaying
making an active choice, depending on which as well as on how many market alternatives are
added. Indeed, as documented in the meta-analyses of Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd
(2010) and Chernev, Bo¨ckenholt, and Goodman (2015), an active choice from the bigger
menu often becomes more likely than it was originally if a sufficiently attractive option is
introduced. This feature of the model, therefore, captures the intuitive channel through
which choice-overload effects are known to arise as well as disappear with menu expansion.
We further show that additional information from observable data of this kind may in
special cases also be recoverable by means of their multicriteria logit representation whereby
there exist k strictly positive utility functions ul on X such that
ρ
(
a,A ∪ {o}) = k∏
l=1
ul(a)∑
b∈A
ul(b)
, (2)
where the collection (ui)
k
i=1 is unique up to a joint ratio-scale transformation in the sense
that, if (vi)
k
i=1 is another such representation of ρ, then each ui is a positive linear trans-
formation of a unique vj. The distinct utility functions in this model can be thought of as
capturing different cardinal criteria according to which the market alternatives are ranked
by the average decision maker in the sample, with these rankings generally in conflict with
each other (e.g. due to product price vs quality trade-offs; house comfort level vs location;
treatment efficacy vs side effects). Interpreting the criteria, for example, as specifying dif-
ferent signal distributions whose realizations favour the respective alternatives, the average
decision maker can be thought of as simultaneously requiring strictly favourable draws from
every such distribution before choosing a market alternative or, in the absence of such una-
nimity, as requiring that sufficiently many favourable signals are received that are strong
enough to offset any unfavourable ones. Such multiplicity of cardinal criteria appears to be
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new in the stochastic choice literature but is conceptually analogous to those found in the
analysis of multicriteria games (Shapley, 1959; Roemer, 1999) and especially in multi-utility
representations of incomplete preferences under risk and uncertainty (Shapley and Baucells,
1998; Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok, 2004; Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella, 2012; Galaabaatar and
Karni, 2013; Hara, Ok, and Riella, 2019; Aumann, 1962). By analogy to such representa-
tions, functions ul and uh in this model can be thought of as representing separately on
attributes l and h the average decision maker’s preferences. Unlike those models, however,
which do not feature a specific decision rule but do predict that a is strictly preferred to b
(hence, implicitly, that a is always chosen over b at {a, b}) whenever the former is better than
the latter according to all criteria, here it is not just the existence of unanimous dominance
ul(a) > ul(b) for all l ≤ k, but also its degree that dictates how likely it is that a will be
chosen over b or whether the outside option will be chosen instead. This degree is increasing
in the utility difference ul(a)− ul(b) corresponding to each l ≤ k.
We show, finally, that any multicriteria logit admits a tractable discrete-choice formula-
tion under the distributional assumption of type-1 extreme-value errors that are independent
across alternatives and utility criteria, and also under the behavioural assumption of maxi-
mally dominant choice with incomplete preferences. The former is an extension of a standard
assumption in discrete-choice modelling. The latter amounts to the average decision maker
being portrayed as having preferences that are captured by a possibly incomplete preorder
and as making an active choice if and only if a most preferred alternative exists (Gerasimou,
2011; 2018, Section 2; Costa-Gomes et al., 2020). This simple model is the only model of
choice with incomplete preferences that predicts fully consistent active choices, and therefore
imposes rich sets of restrictions. On the descriptive side, it explains Buridan-paradox types
of behaviour such as the one reported in Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993): “At the
bookstore, [Thomas Schelling] was presented with two attractive encyclopedias and, finding it
difficult to choose between the two, ended up buying neither – this, despite the fact that had
only one encyclopaedia been available he would have happily bought it.” We conclude, finally,
with the presentation of two special cases of (1) and (2) that apply to the empirically rele-
vant domains of binary choice with an outside option and provide complementary insights
on preferences and decision difficulty in such environments.
2 Motivating Examples
Example 1
Let X := {a, b, c} and consider the decision-conflict and dual-logit models on X where
u(a) = 72, u(b) = 72, u(c) = 68.89,
D({a, b}) = 145, D({a, c}) = 141.1, D({b, c}) = 141.1, D({a, b, c}) = 427.2;
u1(a) = 8, u1(b) = 9, u1(c) = 8.3,
u2(a) = 9, u2(b) = 8, u2(c) = 8.3.
The three alternatives here are very similar and there is no obvious dominance relationship
between any two of them. The information in both representations suggests that decision
difficulty is increased and an active choice is less likely in the ternary menu (Figure 1). Such
a similarity-driven choice-overload effect in turn is consistent with the findings in recent em-
pirical studies that suggest a positive link between similarity of the alternatives and decision
3
Figure 1: Similarity-driven choice overload (Example 1).
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complexity (Sela, Berger, and Liu, 2009; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd, 2010; Bhatia
and Mullett, 2018).
Example 2
In the opposite direction, the meta-analyses in Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010)
and Chernev, Bo¨ckenholt, and Goodman (2015) point to the conclusion that choice-overload
effects are mitigated or even disappear when the larger menu includes a clearly superior
market alternative. To see how the proposed modelling framework predicts such an effect,
consider the decision-conflict and dual-logit ρ where
u(a) = 100, u(b) = 1, u1(c) = 1,
D({a, b}) = 25, D({a, c}) = 25, D({b, c}) = 4.25, D({a, b, c}) = 54.25;
u1(a) = 10, u1(b) = 2, u1(c) = 0.5,
u2(a) = 10, u2(b) = 0.5, u2(c) = 2.
Figure 2: Mitigation of choice overload when a sufficiently attractive option is introduced (Example 2).
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Alternatives b and c are similarly attractive while a is far superior to both of them. Consis-
tent with the reason-based arguments in Tversky and Shafir (1992) and Shafir, Simonson,
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and Tversky (1993), the double dominance of a at {a, b, c} makes an active choice more likely
at that menu than at {b, c} where no dominance exists. Consistent with this intuition, the
model-predicted probability of an active choice at {b, c} is 0.32 in this example, whereas at
{a, b, c} it rises to 0.65 (Figure 2).
Example 3
Dhar and Simonson (2003) were the first to report a weakening of the compromise effect
(Simonson, 1989) when choice is not forced, whereby a considerable proportion of subjects
opted for the choice-deferral outside option in the target ternary menu that included the
two extreme and one compromise option. This was contrasted with their finding that the
attraction effect (Huber, Payne, and Puto, 1982) was actually strengthened in such non-
forced choice settings. The authors suggested reason-based choice explanations for these
findings that included the presence or absence of an objective dominance relation within the
menu (cf Example 2). While the hereby proposed models cannot capture genuine asymmetric
dominance effects because they retain the IIA axiom on active-choice probabilities, they do
predict such a weakening of the compromise effect that is driven by this kind of reason-based
logic.
To illustrate, consider the decision-conflict logit where
u(a) = 18, u(b) = 18, u1(c) = 18,
D({a, b}) = 18, D({a, c}) = 18, D({b, c}) = 18, D({a, b, c}) = 24.
Figure 3: Weakening of the compromise effect when choice is not forced (Example 3).
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Although this model does not admit a dual-logit representation, we assume for simplicity
(and without loss of generality) that the alternatives can be represented in two dimensions
as in Figure 3. With D here being strictly monotonic in menu expansion and the three
alternatives similarly attractive, the model’s predictions are in the spirit of the Dhar and
Simonson (2003) findings (cf their Table 2).
3 Related Literature
Standard discrete choice models treat the outside option like any other alternative and predict
that it is chosen when its Luce utility is higher than that of all feasible market alternatives
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(see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) or Matzkin (2019), for example). To contrast this
decision rule with the above-mentioned maximally dominant choice model with incomplete
preferences and a distinct behavioural model of overload-constrained utility maximization,
we provided an axiomatization of this kind of utility maximization with an outside option in
a general deterministic framework in Gerasimou, (2018, Section 3). Starting with Manzini
and Mariotti (2014), several random choice models of limited attention have also required or
allowed for the inclusion of an outside option recently (Brady and Rehbeck, 2016; Dardanoni
et al., 2020; Abaluck and Adams, 2020; Cattaneo et al., 2020; Barseghyan et al., 2019; Aguiar
et al., 2018). The outside option in these models is chosen when no attention is paid to any
of the market alternatives and its choice probability is always decreasing as menus become
bigger. Horan (2019) has recently shown, however, that removing the outside option is
inconsequential for these models’ general features and primary purpose, which is to explain
active-choice decision making subject to cognitive constraints. Our approach is distinct
from –and complementary to– all the above, being relevant in situations where every feasible
alternative is both desirable and paid attention to. In the proposed framework the average
agent is preference-maximizing but her active choices are potentially hard due to comparison
difficulties. Unlike the above models, this allows for the intuitive (non-)monotonicities that
were illustrated in Section 3.
Also distinct from (1) and (2) is the perception-adjusted logit model in Echenique, Saito,
and Tserenjigmid (2018) and the nested stochastic choice model in Kovach and Tserenjigmid
(2019). In the former, choice probabilities are influenced by the alternatives’ position in a
priority ordering. As the authors showed, the choice probability of the outside option is
weakly higher in that model than what it would have been in the corresponding logit model,
with its utility being the sum of its menu-independent utility and an additional, menu-
dependent component. The axiomatization and generalization of the nested logit model
(Ben-Akiva, 1973; Train, 2009, Chapter 4) in Kovach and Tserenjigmid (2019) also allows
for the inclusion of an outside option where one nest comprises all market alternatives and
the second nest only contains the outside option (see Koujianou-Goldberg (1995) for an
influential application of such a model). Unlike a decision-conflict or multicriteria logit, this
specification assigns a menu-independent utility to the outside option and therefore cannot
easily explain the behavioural phenomena that were mentioned and illustrated above. The
model studied in Kovach and U¨lku¨ (2020) predicts that the outside option is chosen if none of
the feasible market alternatives is preferred to a randomly specified threshold. The authors
showed that this is a special case of a random utility model where the outside option is treated
like a market alternative. The multicriteria logit, moreover, differs from the rank-ordered logit
(Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman, 1981) which estimates the probabilities of complete orderings
–as opposed to choice probabilities of market alternatives– with a functional form that is
similar to (2).
Conceptually related but distinct from the proposed models are also the logit models with
costly information sampling and rational inattention in Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), Caplin,
Dean, and Leahy (2019) and their extension in dynamic environments that was analysed in
Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017). In a different strand of work, moreover, Fudenberg
and Strzalecki (2015) characterized a generalization of dynamic logit under uncertainty that,
in addition to a preference for flexibility, allows for choice-overload-like effects whereby re-
moving items from a menu could increase that menu’s valuation. In our decision-conflict
logit such an effect manifests itself through a decrease in the menu-dependent utility of the
outside option. Working within a forced- and non-forced general choice environment, respec-
tively, Frick (2016) and Gerasimou (2018, Section 4) studied threshold general choice models
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that also predict choice-overload effects by means of menu complexity functions that are
monotonic in set inclusion and lead to increased levels of choice inconsistency and choice de-
ferrals, respectively, as menus expand. Deb and Zhou (2018) studied choice overload with an
attribute-based model of reference-dependent preferences. Buturak and Evren (2017) took
menus of lotteries as the primitive and modelled the decision maker as making an active
choice at a menu if and only if the Sarver (2008) regret-inclusive expected utility of the most
preferred feasible alternative exceeds the menu-independent cut-off utility of the outside op-
tion. For models of indecisiveness aversion, commitment and flexibility in the literature of
preferences over menus of lotteries, finally, we refer the reader to Danan, Guerdjikova, and
Zimper (2012) and Pejsachowicz and Toussaert (2017).
4 The Decision-Conflict Logit
4.1 Characterization and General Properties
Let X be the grand choice set of finitely many and at least two market alternatives with
generic elements a, b ∈ X. Let o 6∈ X be the outside option. Define further the augmented
choice set X := X ∪{o} and let D := {A∪{o} : ∅ 6= A ⊆ X} be the collection of all decision
problems, where a nonempty A ⊆ X is a menu andM := {A ⊆ X : A 6= ∅} is the collection
of all menus. The generic element of a decision problem A∪{o} will be denoted by x and may
stand for a market alternative in menu A or for the outside option. A random non-forced
choice model on X is a function ρ : X × D → R+ such that ρ(x,A ∪ {o}) ∈ [0, 1] for all
A∪{o} ∈ D and x ∈ A∪{o}; ρ(x,A∪{o}) = 0 for all x 6∈ A∪{o}; ∑x∈A∪{o} ρ(x,A∪{o}) = 1.
This definition is formally equivalent to that of a random choice model with an outside option
and reserves a special role for that option by allowing for it to be chosen and yet to also
be treated separately from market alternatives. Compared to the papers cited earlier, our
slightly different formulation, terminology and notation aims to highlight this option’s special
nature (indeed, it is the only one that is feasible in every menu) and also to make it more
transparent that we distinguish here between active-choice behaviour that pertains to choice
of market alternatives and the avoidant/deferring behaviour that is reflected in the choice
of that option.
Like Luce (1959) and many papers since, we assume that the domain of a random non-
forced choice model ρ includes all decision problems. The minimal structure on such a ρ that
we will be imposing throughout consists of the following three axioms, to be supplemented
by additional ones in the sequel:
Desirability
If a ∈ X, then ρ(a, {a, o}) = 1.
Positivity
If |A| ≥ 2 and x ∈ A ∪ {o}, then ρ(x,A ∪ {o}) > 0.
Active-Choice Luce (ACL)
If a, b ∈ X and A,B ⊇ {a, b}, then
ρ(a,A ∪ {o})
ρ(b, A ∪ {o}) =
ρ(a,B ∪ {o})
ρ(b, B ∪ {o}) .
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Desirability –which is also implicit in the original Luce (1959) model without an outside
option– implies that every market alternative is sufficiently good to always be chosen when it
is the only feasible one. Thus, when the outside option is chosen in other menus, this is due to
reasons other than the potential unattractiveness of market alternatives, which is a different
and often valid explanation of such behaviour that lies outside the scope of our analysis.
The most general of our results below does afford a generalization that relaxes Desirability,
assuming that one is willing to accept the interpretation within the model captured in (1)
that singleton menus also generate decision conflict. While this may indeed be the case
in some real binary decisions, retaining the Desirability axiom throughout allows for not
confounding the indecisiveness channel toward choice-avoidant behaviour with the distinct
channel of undesirability, although, of course, both channels may be simultaneously present
in practice.
Positivity is a standard axiom in the literature and allows for a crisper illustration of
the key novel ideas that are put forward here. In view of Desirability, we restrict its scope
of application to non-singleton menus only. Implicitly already assuming Positivity in its
statement, ACL imposes the standard kind of IIA-consistency only in the choice probabilities
of market alternatives, while allowing the choice probabilities pertaining to pairs {o, a} that
comprise the outside option and a market alternative to deviate from it. In recent work
(Gerasimou, 2011; 2018; Costa-Gomes et al., 2020) we have argued on conceptual, theoretical
and empirical grounds that observable active choices are more likely to conform to no-cycle
principles of consistency such as the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) when these
choices are not forced upon decision makers than when they are. To the extent that this
tends to be true in general, the intuitive appeal of ACL in a non-forced choice environment is
increased compared to that of the standard IIA axiom in a forced-choice setting, considering
also the formal analogy between WARP and the more general Luce Axiom (which also applies
without Positivity) that was recently established in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2020).
Proposition 1
The following are equivalent for a random non-forced choice model ρ on X:
1. ρ satisfies Desirability, Positivity and Active-Choice Luce.
2. ρ is a decision-conflict logit.
Before proceeding further, we note in passing that a decision-conflict logit ρ also satis-
fies Active-Choice Strong Stochastic Transitivity, defined as the weakening of the standard
version of the axiom whereby, for all a, b, c ∈ X, ρ(a, {a, b, o}) ≥ 1
2
and ρ(b, {b, c, o}) ≥ 1
2
implies ρ(a, {a, c, o}) ≥ max{ρ(a, {a, b, o}), ρ(b, {b, c, o})}.
Let us now turn to the implications that (not) imposing some additional structure has
on the model’s predictions. To this end, we first define a decision-conflict logit ρ = (u,D) to
be (strictly) monotonic if D is monotonic in the sense that D(A) ≥ D(B) (D(A) > D(B))
whenever A ⊃ B. That is, decision difficulty in such a model is (strictly) increasing in menu
inclusion. Next, let us introduce a weakening of the fundamental Regularity axiom. The
standard version of this axiom requires the choice probability of any alternative to decrease
when additional items are introduced in a menu, and is implied by all random-utility models
(Block and Marschak, 1960). Similar to ACL, our version of the axiom requires that this be
true for all alternatives but the outside option.
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Active-Choice Regularity (ACR)
If a ∈ B ⊂ A, then ρ(a,B ∪ {o}) ≥ ρ(a,A ∪ {o}).
The next axiom, finally, describes behaviour that goes in the opposite direction to ACR
as far as choice of the outside option is concerned. Although this is in line with the general
direction pointed to by choice-overload findings (cf Example 1), it rules out the documented
pattern that was mentioned previously (cf Example 2) according to which the addition of
a sufficiently superior option often makes an active choice more likely despite the resulting
menu expansion.
Deferral Anti-Regularity (DA)
If A ⊃ B, then ρ(o, A ∪ {o}) ≥ ρ(o,B ∪ {o})
Observation 1
1. A decision-conflict logit may violate Active-Choice Regularity.
2. A monotonic decision-conflict logit satisfies Active-Choice Regularity.
3. A monotonic decision-conflict logit may violate Deferral Anti-Regularity.
4. A decision-conflict logit that satisfies Deferral Anti-Regularity is monotonic.
The second and last points are straightforward to prove, while examples illustrating the first
and third points are easy to construct (for the third point, see Example 2).
4.2 Connection with Logit Models
A random non-forced choice model ρ on X admits a Luce (1959)/logit representation with
an outside option if there exists a function u : X ∪ {o} → R++ such that, for all menus
A ⊆ X and a ∈ A,
ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) = u(a)∑
b∈A
u(b) + u(o)
, (3)
where u(o) is the menu-independent utility of the outside option. Next, by a random forced-
choice model ρ on X we will refer to one that satisfies the properties of a non-forced choice
model and, in addition, is such that
∑
a∈A ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) ≡
∑
a∈A ρ(a,A) = 1 for all A ⊆ X.
Thus, the outside option is either infeasible or never chosen in such a model. A forced-
choice ρ admits a logit/Luce representation without an outside option if there exists some
u : X → R++ such that, for all A and a ∈ A,
ρ(a,A) =
u(a)∑
b∈A
u(b)
. (4)
Clearly, the decision-conflict and multicriteria logit models become the logit model with an
outside option, (3), if o ∈ X and the Luce-IIA axiom applies to all alternatives in this X.
Then, D(·) ≡ u(o) > 0 in (1), while k = 1 in (2), which also features an additional u(o) > 0
term. The models defined by (1), (2) and (3) are logically distinct.
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Next, towards clarifying the relationship between (1) and (4) we introduce the following
axiom that effectively amounts to ρ being a random forced-choice model.
Active Choices
For every menu A, ρ(o, A ∪ {o}) = 0.
This axiom implies Desirability. In its presence, moreover, Positivity reduces to ρ(a,A ∪
{o}) > 0 whenever |A| ≥ 2 and a ∈ A, while ACL becomes the standard Luce-IIA condition.
Therefore, the next result emerges as a direct implication of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1
The following are equivalent:
1. ρ is a decision-conflict logit such that D(A) = 0 for every menu A.
2. ρ is a logit without an outside option.
3. ρ satisfies Active Choices, Positivity and Luce-IIA.
The equivalence between the last two statements is due to Luce (1959).
4.3 Special Case: Binary Attributes and Similarity-Induced Conflict
As was previously mentioned, recent empirical studies have suggested that decision difficulty
is often increasing in the similarity of the available choice alternatives (Sela, Berger, and
Liu, 2009; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd, 2010; Bhatia and Mullett, 2018), although
experimental evidence and theoretical models pointing in the opposite direction also exist
(see, for example, Tversky and Russo, 1969 and Natenzon, 2019, respectively). To incorpo-
rate this insight into our analysis more concretely, and to make the latter potentially more
applicable, we will now impose some additional structure on the baseline decision-conflict
logit.
To this end, we first assume that the alternatives can be described in terms of a total m
observable attributes. Following this, we can rewrite the grand choice set as X ⊆ {0, 1}m,
so that a ∈ X is now understood to be an m-tuple of 1-0 binary values that indicate,
respectively, whether that alternative possesses a certain attribute or not. With m = 5, for
example, this approach might be relevant towards modelling the possibly bounded-rational
average consumer who may perceive and try to compare multi-attribute products in a binary
manner on the basis of whether these products possess one or more of the following observable
–and assumed desirable– attributes: “price below $100”; “four-star customer rating”; “top
brand name”; “weight below 100g”; “one-day delivery”.
Next, we consider for simplicity the well-known and routinely computable Jaccard simi-
larity index (Jaccard, 1912) that quantifies the similarity between a and b by
S(a, b) :=
m∑
j=1
ajbj
m∑
j=1
a2j +
m∑
j=1
b2j −
m∑
j=1
ajbj
.
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The value of this symmetric index at the pair (a, b) is the number of attributes that the two
alternatives have in common as a proportion of the total number of attributes between them.
It is a special case of the Tversky (1977) similarity index that is not necessarily symmetric.
Also unlike the more general Tversky index, the mapping defined by (a, b) 7→ 1 − S(a, b) is
a proper dissimilarity metric on X (Levandowsky and Winter, 1971).
Writing a = (a1, . . . , am) for a ∈ X, to complete the specification we finally define
u(a) :=
(
1
m
m∑
s=1
as
)p
, (5)
D(A) :=
∑
a,b∈A
S(a, b)− |A|(|A|
2
)− |A| , (6)
where p ≥ 1 is a sensitivity parameter. Here, the utility of an alternative is a strictly
increasing function of its attributes after normalization by the total number of possible
attributes. In particular, for any p ≥ 1, u(a) attains the maximum possible value of 1 if
and only if a is “ideal” in the sense that as = 1 for all s ≤ m. On the other hand, Decision
difficulty at a menu is identified with the average similarity between the distinct alternatives
at that menu (recall that S(a, a) = 1 for all a ∈ X). Under this specification, therefore, the
common range of u and D is the unit interval. We will refer to (1) when u and D are defined
by (5)–(6) as the similarity-conflict logit.
Observation 2
The similarity-conflict logit allows for violations of monotonicity and Active-Choice Regu-
larity.
It is easily seen that violations of ACR with respect to menus A,B with A ⊃ B and
alternative a ∈ B can occur if and only if
D(B)−D(A) >
∑
b∈A\B
u(b).
In the context of the present model this may be interpreted as saying that, for the choice of a
market alternative to become more likely when more items are added to a menu, the marginal
benefit to decision-difficulty alleviation that is brought about by the lower average similarity
in the expanded menu must exceed the utility benefit from the additional alternatives. To
illustrate the intuition for this and also for the non-monotonicity of D, consider the example
where a := (1, 0, 1, 0), b := (0, 1, 0, 1), c := (1, 0, 1, 0), B := {a, c} and B = {a, b, c}.
While distinct, the alternatives a and c are identical in terms of their common attributes,
hence perfectly similar: D(B) = 1. Alternative b on the other hand does not share any
attributes with a or c, and is therefore perfectly dissimilar to them. Thus, adding b to the
menu decreases average similarity: D(A) = 1
3
. For any parameter p ≥ 1, finally, the model
predicts ρ(a,A∪{o}) > ρ(a,B∪{o}), in violation of ACR. Indeed, we have D(B)−D(A) =
2
3
> (0.5)p = u(b), for all p ≥ 1.
We stress, however, that even though such predictions may be intuitive and descriptively
relevant in certain contexts, the relationship between similarity and decision difficulty is
more complex than what this simple model can capture. The analysis of this subsection
nevertheless suggests ways in which the general decision-conflict logit can be applied, and
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also highlights the potential relevance of binary-attribute modelling in bounded-rational
decision making.
5 The Multicriteria Logit
5.1 General Properties
Towards analysing the multicriteria logit defined in (2) let us first note that models admitting
such a representation belong to the more general polynomial logit class that is defined by
ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) =
k∏
l=1
 ul(a)∑
b∈A
ul(b)
p , (7)
where p ≥ 1 is an integer. One observes that: (i) the standard logit without an outside
option obtains as the special case of (7) where k = p = 1; (ii) the multicriteria logit emerges
when p = 1 and k ≥ 1; (iii) and the power logit –also a random non-forced choice model–
corresponds to those cases where k = 1 and p > 1. Extending an interpretation for the
multicriteria logit that was mentioned in the introduction, the power logit might be thought
of as portraying the average decision maker as drawing from a unique signal distribution but,
due to a potential lack of confidence in that distribution, also as simultaneously requiring
more than one favourable draw before choosing a given market alternative.
Now, if (ui)
k
i=1 with k ≥ 2 is a collection of strictly positive real-valued functions on X
that comprise a multicriteria representation of a random non-forced model ρ in the sense of
(2), it also defines the decision-conflict logit (u,D) where, for every menu A and alternative
a ∈ A,
u(a) :=
k∏
l=1
ul(a), (8)
D(A) :=
k∏
l=1
∑
b∈A
ul(b)−
∑
b∈A
k∏
l=1
ul(b). (9)
We first identify the uniqueness structure of the multicriteria logit. To this end, given
such a non-forced choice model ρ = (ui)
k
i=1, we will refer to another collection of strictly
positive functions (vi)
k
i=1 on X as a joint ratio-scale transformation of (ui)
k
i=1 if there is a
permutation pi on {1, . . . , k} such that, for all i ≤ k and all j, l ≤ |X|,
ui(aj)
ui(al)
=
vpi(i)(aj)
vpi(i)(al)
. (10)
That is, each uj in (ui)
k
i=1 is a positive linear transformation of a unique vh in (vi)
k
i=1.
Proposition 2
A multicriteria logit is unique up to a joint ratio-scale transformation.
Next, we define the special class of strictly monotonic decision-conflict logit models ρ =
(u,D) that comprises those where the complexity function D is additive in the sense that,
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for every menu A,
D(A) =
∑
a,b∈A
D({a, b}). (11)
Assuming –as we do throughout this paper– that full attention is paid to all feasible al-
ternatives (e.g. because their number is relatively small and/or the decision’s importance
is high), it is intuitive that the average agent’s decision difficulty at a menu is a strictly
increasing function of the pairs of distinct alternatives in it. Indeed, it is the comparisons at
binary menus that ultimately determine the best alternative overall, if one exists, and how
difficult it is to find one. The additivity condition disciplines the structure of this monotonic
relationship in an analytically convenient way that, as will be shown below, also provides a
bridge between the general decision-conflict and dual-logit models. Analogously, we refer to
(u,D) and D as supper-additive if, for every menu A,
D(A) >
∑
a,b∈A
D({a, b}). (12)
We will further say that (u,D) and D are convex if, for all menus A, S and T such that
A = S ∪ T , S ∩ T = ∅ and max{|S|, |T |} ≥ 2,
D(A) > D(S) +D(T ). (13)
Such a model predicts that introducing new pairs of options in a menu increases decision
difficulty very rapidly. Despite this fact, however, and consistent with the previous discussion,
the DA axiom may still be violated because the degree of decision difficulty at a menu, as
captured by D, is measured on the same cardinal scale as the degree of attractiveness of
the various market alternatives, as captured by u. Therefore, ρ(o, A) < ρ(o,B) may well be
possible when A ⊃ B if one of the alternatives in A \ B is sufficiently attractive, although
convexity of D makes such an event less likely.
Proposition 3
The following are true for a multicriteria logit ρ = (ui)
k
i=1 on X:
1. ρ is a convex decision-conflict logit.
2. ρ is an additive decision-conflict logit when k = 2 and super-additive when k > 2.
3. ρ satisfies Active-Choice Regularity but may violate Deferral Anti-Regularity.
Regarding the last point, that such a model does not imply DA in general was already seen
in Example 2.
5.2 Revealed Incomplete Preferences
If choice probabilities are representable as in the standard logit models –with or without an
outside option– in (3) and (4), the analyst can infer the complete preference ranking of the av-
erage decision maker by comparing the Luce utility values of the different alternatives. Given
the way in which these utilities are defined, such comparisons can equivalently be thought
of as comparisons between the relative choice probabilities of the different alternatives. Now
consider a multicriteria logit ρ = (ul)
k
l=1 with decision-conflict representation (u,D). We can
define the average consumer’s generally incomplete revealed preference relations DC and
MC on X by
a DC b ⇐⇒ u(a) > u(b) and u(a) ≥ D({a, b}), (14)
a MC b ⇐⇒ ul(a) ≥ ul(b) for all l ≤ k, with at least one strict inequality. (15)
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Proposition 4
If ρ is multicriteria logit, then
a DC b =⇒ a MC b. (16)
The converse is not true in general.
Under these definitions, therefore, the multicriteria logit does indeed allow for additional
information to be recovered about the average consumer’s preferences whenever the data
admit both representations, and this additional information does not contradict the more
conservative conclusions arrived at through the decision-conflict logit representation. To
illustrate, consider the example choice probabilities in Table 1. These data admit both a
decision-conflict logit representation (u,D) and a dual-logit representation (u1, u2):
Table 1: Model-based preference recovery from dual-logit representable choice probabilities: Example.
{a, o} {b, o} {c, o} {a, b, o} {a, c, o} {b, c, o} {a, b, c, o}
a 1 – – 1230
16
30 –
8
30
b – 1 – 330 –
10
30
2
30
c – – 1 – 230
5
30
1
30
o 0 0 0 1530
12
30
15
30
19
30
u(a) = 8, u(b) = 2, u(c) = 1,
D({a, b}) = 10, D({a, c}) = 6, D({b, c}) = 3;
u1(a) = 4, u1(b) = 1, u1(c) = 1,
u2(a) = 2, u2(b) = 2, u2(c) = 1.
Therefore, one can infer here that a DC c and a MC b MC c, consistent with (16).
We remark that the above definition of DC can be formulated equivalently as
a DC b ⇐⇒ u(a) > u(b) + δa,b,
where δa,b ≥ 0 is defined by
δa,b = max{D({a, b})− u(b), 0}.
Thus, DC can be thought of as a stochastic interval order. For a detailed analysis of
stochastic semi-orders where δa,b is constant for all a, b ∈ X we refer the reader to Horan
(2020).
5.3 The Dual Logit
We now study the dual-logit special case of (2) in more detail. In this model there are two
criteria u1, u2 : X → R++, so that ρ satisfies
ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) = u1(a)∑
b∈A
u1(b)
· u2(a)∑
b∈A
u2(b)
(17)
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and (8), (9) reduce to the simpler decision-conflict logit (u,D) defined by
u(a) := u1(a)u2(a), (18)
D({a, b}) := u1(a)u2(b) + u1(b)u2(a). (19)
The argument in the proof of Proposition 1 –which extends that in Luce (1959)– effectively
provides an algorithm for constructing a decision-conflict logit (u,D) from a dataset that
conforms to that model’s axioms. In the remaining part of this section our aim is to develop
a similar algorithm for checking if a (u,D) representation of some ρ also admits a dual
logit (u1, u2) representation. We will do so by formulating the dual-logit existence problem
as one of solving a system of bilinear equations. Toward that end, we apply and adapt
the general solution theory for such systems that was recently developed in the multilinear
algebra literature by Johnson, Sˇmigoc, and Yang (2014).
It will be convenient to let X := {a1, . . . , a|X|} throughout this section. For any h ≤ |X|
and any distinct h, l ≤ |X|, define the symmetric and Boolean |X| × |X| matrices Ehh and
Ehl by
Ehhij :=
{
1, if i = j = h,
0, otherwise
, Ehlij :=
 1, if i = h and j = l,1, if i = l and j = h,0, otherwise (20)
Given the postulated additive model ρ = (u,D), we wish to recover the functions u1, u2 :
X → R++ by solving the system of bilinear equations
u1Esu
2 = (u,D)s, s = 1, 2, . . . ,m(|X|), (21)
where u1 :=
(
u1(a1), . . . , u1(a|X|
)
, u2 :=
(
u2(a1), . . . , u2(a|X|
)
are the system’s unknown |X|-
vectors that list the values of u1 and u2; each Es is an |X|×|X| matrix that belongs to one of
the two types in (20); and, for all s, (u,D)s > 0 is a scalar that corresponds to a value u(ai)
or D({ai, aj}) at some ai ∈ X or binary menu {ai, aj} ⊆ X, respectively. To illustrate this
formulation of the problem when |X| = 3, for example, notice that (21) can be expanded as
follows in this special case:
u1
 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
u2 = u(a1), u1
 0 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
u2 = u(a2),
u1
 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 1
u2 = u(a3), u1
 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 0
u2 = D({a1, a2}),
u1
 0 0 10 0 0
1 0 0
u2 = D({a1, a3}), u1
 0 0 00 0 1
0 1 0
u2 = D({a2, a3}).
Importantly, the assumed additivity of D implies that, in addition to the values of u
on X, all information of interest in this problem is contained in the values of D at the
binary menus alone. Thus, the bilinear system of m(|X|) equations in 2|X| unknowns that
is specified in (21) does not feature any obvious linear dependencies –by which we mean
that some of its matrices Es are linearly dependent. Although the absence of such obvious
linear relationships does not by itself imply that the matrices in (21) are, in fact, linearly
independent, this necessary condition for the system’s solvability (Johnson, Sˇmigoc, and
Yang, 2014) is indeed satisfied in (21).
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Lemma 1
The matrices Es in (21) are linearly independent.
While a necessary condition for the solvability of (21), however, linear independence is
not sufficient in general. Also, the specific and easily testable sufficient conditions that were
given in Johnson, Sˇmigoc, and Yang (2014, Theorems 5.1 & 5.3) are violated by (21). There-
fore, we build instead on their more general but less direct solvability method (Theorem 3.1).
The general idea of that method (see also Johnson and Link, 2009) is that a particular linear
system that is derived from the bilinear one is solved first, and a search is then carried out
over all solutions to that linear system in order to find some that allows for the matrix that is
obtained by columnising the corresponding solution vector to be of rank 1 and, therefore, to
admit a decomposition as the outer product of two vectors that are solutions to the original
bilinear system. This search, however, can be hard. Applying their algorithm by exploiting
the features of the dual-logit model we will arrive at a test that allows for a fast solvability
decision and, if a solution exists, for its recovery.
Step 1. Start by ordering the equations in (21) as follows (see above for |X| = 3):
E1 = E
11, . . . ,E|X| = E|X||X|,E|X|+1 = E12, . . . ,E|X|+2 = E13, . . . ,Em(|X|) = E(|X|−1)|X|.
Now define the |X|2 ×m(|X|) matrix
E :=
(
vec(E1), . . . , vec(Em(|X|)
)
.
(Notation: if A is a p × p real matrix, denote by vec(A) the p2-vector that results from
A by putting the columns of that matrix in a single column, starting with column 1 and
continuing in ascending order.) By Theorem 3.1 in Johnson, Sˇmigoc, and Yang (2014), if
u1, u2 solve the bilinear system (21), then they also solve the linear system
ET · vec(u1 · u2) = D|X|, (22)
where vec(u1·u2) is the unknown |X|2-vector in (22) that contains product terms u1(ai)u2(aj)
for i, j ≤ |X|, and D|X| is the m(|X|)-vector of constants defined by
D|X| :=
(
u(a1), · · · , u(a|X|), D({a1, a2}), · · · , D({a1, a|X|}), D({a2, a3}), · · · , D({a|X|−1, a|X|})
)
.
Lemma 2
The linear system (22) has infinitely many solutions.
Step 2. Define the square matrix
U :=

u1(a1)u2(a1) u1(a1)u2(a2) . . . u1(a1)u2(a|X|)
u1(a2)u2(a1) u1(a2)u2(a2) . . . u1(a2)u2(a|X|)
... · · · . . . ...
u1(a|X|)u2(a1) u1(a|X|)u2(a2) . . . u1(a|X|)u2(a|X|)
 (23)
that is obtained by columnising the general solution vec(u1 · u2) to (22) after applying the
unvec linear transformation that maps Rm2 into the space of m×m real matrices Rm×m and
is defined by unvec(vec(A)) := A.
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Notice that the diagonal entries of U are determined uniquely in the general solution to
(22). In addition, U contains 1
2
(|X|2 − |X|) strictly positive free variables that correspond
to the upper-diagonal terms u1(ai)u2(aj) with i < j, and it also follows from (19) that the
strictly positive lower-diagonal terms are then pinned down uniquely by
u1(aj)u2(ai) = D({ai, aj})− u1(ai)u2(aj). (24)
If U is of rank 1 under some admissible solution to the linear system, then it follows from
the Singular Value Decomposition Theorem (see Theorem 3.7.5 in Horn and Johnson, 1985,
for example) that there exist |X|-vectors u1, u2 such that
U = u1 · u2.
That is, U can be decomposed as the outer product of the two solution vectors. We can now
make a stronger formal statement of this fact.
Lemma 3
The system (21) is solvable if and only if U is of rank 1 for some solution to (22).
Step 3 : As noted earlier, checking if a rank-1 matrix U exists for some solution to the
linearized counterpart of some bilinear problem is generally difficult (see pp. 1557-58 in
Johnson, Sˇmigoc, and Yang, 2014). Exploiting the specific structure of our problem that
features the dependence relations (24) between the symmetric off-diagonal terms, to check
if U in (23) is of rank 1 under some solution to (22) we must ultimately solve the following
(generally overdetermined) of symmetric polynomial equations of degree 2 in the 2|X| original
unknowns u1(a1), . . ., u1(a|X|), u2(a1), . . ., u2(a|X|):
u1(a1)u2(a1)
...
u1(a|X|)u2(a|X|)
u1(a1)u2(a2) + u1(a2)u2(a1)
u1(a1)u2(a3) + u1(a3)u2(a1)
...
u1(a|X|−1)u2(a|X|) + u1(a|X|)u2(a|X|−1)

=

u(a1)
...
u(a|X|)
D({a1, a2})
D({a1, a3})
...
D({a|X|−1, a|X|})

(25)
The next result is now immediate.
Lemma 4
The matrix U is of rank 1 for some solution to (22) if and only if (25) is solvable.
In light of Steps 1 – 3 and Lemmas 1 – 4, we can finally state the following.
Proposition 5
There exists a finitely terminating algorithm that decides if an additive decision-conflict logit
(u,D) is a dual logit (u1, u2) and, when this is the case, recovers the latter from the former.
We remark that existing numerical methods (e.g. implemented in Mathematica R©) allow for
instantaneous pass/fail applications of this algorithm and solution recovery to (25) and, in
view of the previous steps, also to (17).
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Notice that, with (u,D) being held fixed on the right hand side of (25), a pair (u1, u2) that
solves (25) is unique up to multiplication by (α, 1
α
) for any α > 0. This does not contradict
the richer joint ratio-scale uniqueness property of a dual logit representation that is implied
by Proposition 2. Notice further that, although the analyst can in practice proceed directly
to (25), the previous steps are not redundant because they show that the reduced system in
(25) contains all the relevant information for a generally much larger system; they place the
existence of a dual logit in the class of bilinear-system problems; and they demonstrate that
there is no obviously faster way towards checking if (21) is solvable.
After normalizing an arbitrary but unique ul(ai) on the left hand side of (25) we observe
that this becomes an overdetermined polynomial system whenever |X| > 2, and its extra
equations increase quadratically in the number of alternatives (see proof of Lemma 2). Not
surprisingly, therefore, the Gro¨bner-basis computer-algebraic method that is often used to
identify conditions for the existence of solutions to symbolic polynomial systems (see, for
example, Buchberger, 1998) produces in our case sets of quadratic equations on the values
of u and D whose number is increasing non-linearly in the cardinality of X. Since, by the
proof of Proposition 1, these ultimately translate into as many quadratic equations in the
choice probabilities at binary menus, this means that, despite the simple characterization of
the model in the binary-choice special case of Proposition 6 that we establish in Section 7,
the dual logit is not finitely axiomatizable in the sense of Scott and Suppes (1958). That
is, there is no fixed set of sentences of first-order logic that can characterize the model
on arbitrary finite domains. As first proved in Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015)
with their Acyclicity axiom, the “Fechnerian” random choice model where ρ(a, {a, b}) =
F
(
u(a) − u(b)) for some u : X → R and strictly increasing F : R → R is not finitely
axiomatizable either, the restrictions in that case comprising domain-dependent systems
of linear inequalities. A similarly compact axiom that would summarize the varying sets of
quadratic equations that are necessary and sufficient for dual logit representations is currently
elusive.
We finally note that, by analogy to the bilinear-system identification of the dual logit, an
algorithm that decides whether a given ρ = (u,D) representation also admits a multicriteria
logit representation with k > 2 would ultimately rely upon being able to solve a multilinear
system of equations. Although such problems can be formalised using tensors, and despite
recent advances in solving problems within this class (see, for example, Brazell, Li, Navasca,
and Tamon, 2013), it appears that no general tensor-inversion method is presently available
that can lead to a general decidability/solvability algorithm for the general multicriteria logit
like the one introduced for the dual logit, which relied heavily on the additivity property of
that special case (cf Proposition 3).
6 Discrete-Choice Formulation of the Multicriteria Logit
Using choice-probability data alone, the explanatory power and goodness-of-fit performance
of the decision-conflict and multicriteria logit models can in principle be assessed non-
parametrically by stochastic-choice adaptations of the well-known Houtman and Maks (1985)
method in revealed preference analysis or the maximal separation method recently introduced
in Apesteguia and Ballester (2020). In addition to such non-parametric analyses, however,
of potential interest in empirical applications is the question of whether these models can
also be embedded in some generalized discrete-choice microeconometric framework. In par-
ticular, if more data are available about the consumers and/or product characteristics, is it
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possible in principle to use these in conjunction with those models to estimate the incomplete
consumer preferences in a sample when there is reason to believe that the no-choice outside
option may have been chosen due to decision difficulty rather than due to the available
market alternatives not being sufficiently desirable or the consumers not paying sufficient
attention to them? In this section we state the assumptions under which the answer to this
question is positive for the multicriteria logit model.
Building on and extending the additive random utility methodology pioneered in Marschak
(1960) and McFadden (1973), we exploit the fact that, in the multicriteria logit ρ = (ul)
k
l=1,
the utility values across all criteria are menu-independent. This allows for incorporating the
well-established analytical framework of logit models by imposing an additive and type-1
extreme value error structure on each ul and to assume that errors are independently and
identically distributed across all alternatives and utility criteria. However, because the un-
derlying preference relation is generally incomplete and, as a consequence, the consumer’s
decision rule is unclear, to complete the discrete-choice specification of our model we also
need to introduce a behavioural assumption.
To this end, we build on some of our previous work (Gerasimou, 2018; Section 2) and
assume that the simple deterministic choice rule followed by the average consumer is that
of maximally dominant choice whereby the consumer maximizes a transitive and menu-
independent but possibly incomplete preference relation % over X in the sense that, for
every menu A ⊆ X, the set C(A) of choosable alternatives in A is such that
C(A) 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ there is a ∈ A such that a % b for all b ∈ A,
C(A) = ∅ ⇐⇒ for all a ∈ A there is b ∈ A such that a 6% b.
Once it is clear that the preference preorder % is possibly incomplete and hence that C(A)
is potentially empty, the above two expressions can be summarized compactly in the more
familiar one
C(A) = {a ∈ A : a % b for all b ∈ A}. (26)
Maximally dominant choice therefore predicts that a market alternative is chosen from a
menu if and only if it is preferred to all other feasible alternatives, and that the choice-
delay outside option is chosen instead when no such alternative exists. This model –which
is supported empirically in the experimental data analysed in Costa-Gomes et al (2020)–
dictates active choices that are consistent with WARP and the other revealed-preference
axioms.
Next, as was shown independently in Evren and Ok (2011) and Kochov (2020), any
preorder % on any domain X is representable by a set of –in our case finitely many– functions
u1, . . . , uk : X → R in the sense that
a % b ⇐⇒ ul(a) ≥ ul(b) for all l ≤ k.
Indeed, applying these authors’ argument to our environment by writing X := {a1, . . . , a|X|}
and U%{ai} := {aj ∈ X : aj % aj}, to obtain such a representation it suffices to define, for
each l ≤ |X|, ul(ai) := 1 if ai % al and ul(ai) := 0 otherwise. Given this fact, we can now
rewrite (26) as
C(A) = {a ∈ A : ul(a) ≥ ul(b) for all b ∈ A and all l ≤ k}. (27)
Under any such representation, the strict preference relation  that is defined as the asym-
metric part of % must satisfy a  b iff ul(a) ≥ ul(b) for all l ≤ k and with at least one
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inequality strict. This is analogous to the definition of the revealed preference relation MC
in the previous section. Note, however, that requiring weak, semi-strict or strict inequalities
is irrelevant for the purposes of this section, as will be clear below.
We assume now that the average decision maker’s unobserved utility from alternative ai
under criterion ul, l ≤ k, is written as
U lni := V
l
ni + 
l
ni,
where
V lni ≡ V lni(xni; βln) := βl · xni
captures her representative utility, xni is a vector of product and/or consumer characteristics,
βl, l ≤ k, is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and lni is a random variable that is
independently and identically distributed across all i and l according to the type-1 extreme-
value probability density function f(lni) = e
−lnie−e
−lni . In conjunction with the maximally
dominant choice assumption (26)-(27), this specification allows for writing
ρm(ai, A ∪ {o}) = Pr(U lni ≥ U lnj ∀ j 6= i ∀ l ≤ k)
= Pr(V lni + 
l
ni ≥ V lnj + lnj ∀ j 6= i ∀ l ≤ k)
=
∫

I(lnj ≤ lni + V lni − V lnj ∀ j 6= i ∀ l ≤ k)f(n)dn
=
k∏
l=1
∫ ∞
−∞
(∏
j 6=i
e−e
−(lni+V lni−V lnj)
)
e−
l
nie−e
−lnidn
=
k∏
l=1
eβ
l·xni
|A|∑
j=1
eβ
l·xnj
, (28)
where I(·) is the indicator function. The step from the third to the fourth equation makes
use of the above distributional and independence assumption on lni, so that
Pr(U lni ≥ U lnj ∀ j 6= i ∀ l ≤ k) =
k∏
l=1
Pr(U lni ≥ U lnj ∀ j 6= i).
The last step follows from the derivation of McFadden’s conditional logit model when errors
are type-1 extreme value (see pp. 74-75 in Train, 2009).
Holding now the choice menu A := {a1, . . . , am} fixed throughout the rest of this section,
for each i ≤ m we write
pni := ρn(ai, A ∪ {o}),
where pno := ρn(o, A∪{o}) = 1−
∑m
i=1 pni > 0. Next, letting yn denote the n-th individual’s
observed choice from A, define the m binary variables yni by
yni :=
{
1, if yn = ai,
0, otherwise.
The multinomial density for a given choice by agent n can then be written as
f(yn) =
n∏
i=1
pynini .
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Assuming an exogenous sample and covariates xni for agent n and alternative i, the log-
likelihood function that results from the independent choices of the N agents is now given
by
L(β1, . . . , βk) =
∑
n
∑
i
yni ln pni
=
∑
n
∑
i
yni ln
 k∏
l=1
eβ
l·xni∑
j
eβ
l·xnj

=
∑
n
∑
i
yni
∑
l
(βl · xni)−
∑
n
∑
i
yni
∑
l
ln
(∑
j
eβ
l·xnj
)
.
The first-order conditions for its maximization are
dL
dβl
=
∑
n
∑
i
ynixni −
∑
n
∑
i
xniλ
l
ni
= 0, l = 1, . . . , k,
where
λlni :=
eβ̂
l·xni∑
j
eβ̂l·xnj
> 0,
∑
i
λlni = 1, and
∏
l
λlni = pni for all i,m, l,
with β̂l the maximum-likelihood estimator of the lth criterion. Similar to the first-order
condition that is associated with the standard conditional logit with a single criterion, rear-
ranging and dividing through by N we get
1
N
∑
n
∑
i
ynixni =
1
N
∑
n
∑
i
xniλ
l
ni, l = 1, . . . , k. (29)
Compared to the case of the standard logit, the left hand side of (29) remains interpretable
as the sample average x of the covariates xni over those alternatives that were actually chosen
by the N agents. The right hand side, however, is the average x̂ of these variables that is
predicted by the choice probabilities of the model’s l-th criterion (which are additive over
the set of market alternatives) and not by the actual model-predicted choice probabilities
(which are not). But since (29) requires that the above optimality condition be satisfied by
the estimator of each of the l criteria, it follows that, if the log-likelihood function has a
unique maximizing point, the multicriteria logit collapses to the power logit (see Section 5.1)
where there is a single vector β̂ such that
pni =
 eβ̂·xni∑
j
eβ̂·xni

k
=
ekβ̂·xni(∑
j
eβ̂·xni
)k . (30)
The remaining task in this case is to use the log-likelihood function alongside some goodness-
of-fit measure such as the Akaike or Bayes-Schwartz Information Criteria to estimate the
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data-optimal exponent k in (30). If on the other hand there are multiple maximizers, then
the possibly distinct criteria in the resulting multicriteria logit can be taken to coincide
with the combination of those maximizers that provide the best fit under some appropriate
measure. Finally, the estimated model’s explanatory value relative to the standard logit with
an outside option or some other similarly evaluable model that allows for choice delay can
also be assessed along these lines.
7 Binary Choice with Opt-Out
We finally focus on the empirically important special case of binary (active) choice where
|X| = 2 and the outside option is also feasible. In particular we study two generally dis-
tinct but overlapping classes of decision-conflict logit models in such domains that allow for
complementary insights to be offered regarding the shape of preferences and the nature of
decision difficulty in a given dataset.
7.1 The Binary Dual Logit
Going back to the dual-logit model in the present binary-choice environment, we introduce
the following novel axiom that is easily seen to be satisfied by all dual-logit models irrespec-
tive of the total number of alternatives.
Constrained Binary Symmetry (CBS)
For all a, b ∈ X,
ρ(o, {a, b, o})
2ρ(a, {a, b, o}) ≥
2ρ(b, {a, b, o})
ρ(o, {a, b, o}) . (31)
An important implication of bounding the two likelihood ratios as in (31) is that when
the two market alternatives are sufficiently choice equi-probable, their choice probabilities
are “low” and the outside option is the strictly most likely choice outcome. This intuitive
implication of CBS is a disciplined formalization of the idea that decision conflict is increased
when the feasible market alternatives are more or less equally attractive. It is illustrated
in Figure 4, the solid part of which depicts the region in the simplex that contains the
permissible probability distributions
(
ρ(o), ρ(a), ρ(b)
)
that arise at a binary menu {a, b} and
are compatible with (31).
Figure 4: Permissible choice probability distributions under the binary dual logit (meshed region).
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Proposition 6
The following are equivalent for a random non-forced choice model ρ on X with |X| = 2:
1. ρ satisfies Desirability, Positivity and Constrained Binary Symmetry (CBS).
2. ρ is a dual logit (u1, u2), and u1 = u2 if and only if CBS holds with equality.
As was anticipated in Section 5.3, the binary dual logit is the only case where a simple and
easily interpretable axiomatization is possible for this model. The characterization further
clarifies that the quadratic power logit model that corresponds to a special case of (7) emerges
in this binary choice environment as the special case of the dual logit where CBS holds with
equality. This special case is depicted on the boundary of the region highlighted in Figure 4.
7.2 The Parabolic Decision-Conflict Logit
A binary random non-forced model ρ = (u,D) is a parabolic decision-conflict logit if there is
α > 0 such that
D({a, b}) = α|u(a)− u(b)| . (32)
This model therefore predicts that the outside option’s appeal is decreasing in the absolute
utility-difference between market alternatives, with α capturing the sensitivity of such a
monotonic relation. The intuition here is that as the absolute utility difference becomes
larger, one of the two market alternatives becomes sufficiently more attractive for an active
choice to be increasingly more likely.
Figure 5: Permissible choice probability distributions under the parabolic decision-conflict logit when α ≥ 0.1,
α ≥ 0.4 and α ≥ 1, respectively (meshed regions).
It is straightforward that the following simple condition, together with Desirability and
Positivity, is necessary and sufficient for such a representation.
Asymmetry
ρ(a, {a, b, o}) 6= ρ(b, {a, b, o}).
We state this simple equivalence without proof.
Proposition 7
The following are equivalent for a random non-forced choice model ρ when |X| = 2:
1. ρ satisfies Desirability, Positivity and Asymmetry.
2. ρ is a parabolic decision-conflict logit.
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Figure 5 depicts collections of choice probability distributions that admit a parabolic decision-
conflict representation for some α′ ≥ α under various values of α. While the range of such
distributions expands as α → 0, Asymmetry prevents it from covering the interior of the
entire simplex.
As can be readily seen by comparing Figures 4 and 5, this model is distinct from the
binary dual logit in general, but it becomes a special case of the latter when α is sufficiently
large, with the cut-off α ' 1. The dual logit is more relevant descriptively either when the
market alternatives are similarly attractive and this similarity translates into high decision
conflict or when one of them is the unambiguously superior option. By contrast, given
some α > 0 that gives rise to a non-degenerate parabolic decision-conflict logit, this model
allows either or both market alternatives to be chosen with relatively significant probabilities
provided that these are not too close to each other and neither of them is too close to 1. Of
interest from an empirical point of view here is the identification of some tight parametric
range of α for which the model has explanatory as well as predictive power.
8 Concluding Remarks
Understanding the “easy” and “hard” parts of individuals’ preferences as revealed by their
active-choice or choice-delay decisions at the time when they were first presented with a
decision problem is important from a methodological and also from a policy and effective
choice-architecture point of view. This paper contributes to this goal by proposing a class of
tractable stochastic choice models in which the choice-deferral outside option is more likely
to be chosen when a clearly superior feasible alternative does not exist. This prediction
is consistent with the conclusions in recent meta-analyses of choice-overload phenomena
and reason-based approaches to decision making that have been proposed in psychology
and marketing research, and differs from the predictions made by existing random choice
models of limited attention or other bounded-rational behaviour. Therefore, the new models
complement existing ones in empirically relevant ways.
Unlike the standard logit with an outside option and random choice models of limited
attention, the proposed models retain the IIA axiom for pairs of market alternatives but not
when the outside option is involved. The fact that the multicriteria logit was shown to admit
a discrete choice formulation under reasonable distributional and behavioural assumptions
makes it applicable not only in empirical work but, upon extending Anderson, de Palma, and
Thisse (1992) and other contributions in the industrial organization literature with product
differentiation, also in monopolistic or oligopolistically competitive markets where consumers
are potentially choice-overloaded by menu or attribute complexity. Modelling the effects of
choice overload in market outcomes is an active area of research, and different ideas have
recently been explored in Kamenica (2008), Gerasimou and Papi (2018), Hefti, Liu, and
Schmutzler (2020) and Nocke and Rey (2020).
We conclude by emphasizing that choice modelling and preference elicitation in the pres-
ence of limited comparability and decision difficulty is a challenging task that necessitates a
variety of methodological approaches. As in other parts of this research programme (Gerasi-
mou, 2016,2018; Costa-Gomes et al., 2020), our focus here has been on the observed ac-
tive choices when the choice-delay outside option is assumed to be feasible to the decision
maker and observable to the analyst, as has also been the case with several recent models
of random choice. Other approaches that are more appropriate when these conditions are
not satisfied include those developed in the literatures of preference imprecision (Cubitt,
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Navarro-Martinez, and Starmer, 2015); preference for randomization (Agranov and Ortol-
eva, 2017, 2020); preference for flexibility (Kreps, 1979; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 2001;
Danan and Ziegelmeyer, 2006); and undominated (Schwartz, 1976; Eliaz and Ok, 2006) or
cyclical forced choices (Mandler, 2005, 2009; Evren, Nishimura, and Ok, 2019).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Recalling the maintained assumption that D is zero at singletons and strictly positive
elsewhere, it is immediate that the second statement implies the first. For the converse
implication, note first that using ACL alongside Positivity, and by suitably adapting the
arguments in Luce (1959), we readily obtain the existence of a function u : X → R++ such
that, for every A ⊆ X and a ∈ A,
ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) = (1− ρ(o, A ∪ {o})) · u(a)∑
b∈A
u(b)
,
where
u(a) := α
ρ(a, {a, z, o})
ρ(z, {a, z, o})
for arbitrary and fixed α > 0 and z ∈ X, and with the notational convention {z, z, o} ≡ {z, o}
in place. By Positivity and Desirability we also get ρ(o, A ∪ {o}) = 0 ⇔ |A| = 1. It follows
now that for every A there is a unique βA ≥ 0 such that
ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) = (1− ρ(o, A ∪ {o})) · u(a)∑
b∈A
u(b)
=
u(a)∑
b∈A
u(b) + βA
. (33)
In particular, defining
βA :=
ρ(o, A ∪ {o})
1− ρ(o, A ∪ {o}) ·
∑
b∈A
u(b)
makes (33) identically true. From (33) and the above remark we get βA = 0 ⇔ |A| = 1
and βA > 0 ⇔ |A| > 1. Defining D : 2X \ {∅} → R+ by D(A) := βA yields (1) with
D(A) = 0 ⇔ |A| = 1. That (u,D) and (u′, D′) represent the same ρ if and only if u = αu′
and D = αD′ for some α > 0 is straightforward. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose ρ = (ui)
k
i=1 is a multicriteria logit and let (vpi(i))
k
i=1 be a joint ratio-scale trans-
formation of (ui)
k
i=1, with pi the corresponding permutation on {1, . . . , k}. By definition, for
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each i ≤ k there is αi > 0 such that ui := αivpi(i). Thus, for any menu A ⊆ X and a ∈ A,
vpi(1)(a)∑
b∈A
vpi(1)(b)
· · · vpi(k)(a)∑
b∈A
vpi(k)(b)
=
α1 · u1(a)
α1 ·
∑
b∈A
u1(b)
· · · αk · uk(a)
αk ·
∑
b∈A
uk(b)
=
u1(a)∑
b∈A
u1(b)
· · · uk(a)∑
b∈A
uk(b)
= ρ(a,A ∪ {o}).
Conversely, suppose (ui)
k
i=1 and (vi)
k
i=1 are multicriteria representations of the same ρ.
First, assume to the contrary that, for all i ≤ k,
vi 6= αupi(i) (34)
for all α > 0 and every permutation pi on {1, . . . , k}. By assumption, for every menu A ⊆ X,
a ∈ A and α1, . . . , αk > 0,
ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) = u1(a)∑
b∈A
u1(b)
· · · uk(a)∑
b∈A
uk(b)
=
v1(a)∑
b∈A
v1(b)
· · · vk(a)∑
b∈A
vk(b)
6= αpi(1)upi(1)(a)
αpi(1)
∑
b∈A
upi(1)(b)
· αpi(2)upi(2)(a)
αpi(2)
∑
b∈A
upi(2)(b)
· · · αpi(k)upi(k)(a)
αpi(k)
∑
b∈A
upi(k)(b)
=
u1(a)∑
b∈A
u1(b)
· · · uk(a)∑
b∈A
uk(b)
,
which is a contradiction. By cancelling out from the above equations any uj, vj such that
vj = αupi(j) under some permutation pi, the same argument can be used repeatedly to rule
out the case where there is an arbitrary number of indices j ≤ k for which (34) is supposedly
true. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
It is immediate that any multicriteria logit satisfies Desirability, Positivity and ACL;
hence, that it is a decision-conflict logit.
1. Suppose A = S ∪ T , S ∩ T = ∅ and max{|S|, |T |} ≥ 2 and assume to the contrary that
D(A) ≤ D(S) +D(T ). This is equivalent to
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈A
ul(a)−
∑
a∈A
k∏
l=1
ul(a) ≤
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈S
ul(a)−
∑
a∈S
k∏
l=1
ul(a) +
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈T
ul(a)−
∑
a∈T
k∏
l=1
ul(a).
Since
∑
a∈A
∏k
l=1 ul(a) =
∑
a∈S
∏k
l=1 ul(a) +
∑
a∈T
∏k
l=1 ul(a) because A = S ∪ T , the above
is equivalent to
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈A
ul(a) ≤
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈S
ul(a) +
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈T
ul(a). (35)
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Now observe that
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈S
ul(a) <
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈A
ul(a) (36)
and
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈T
ul(a) <
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈A
ul(a). (37)
Indeed, letting S := {aS1 , . . . , aS|S|} T := {aT1 , . . . , aT|T |} and recalling that A = S∪T , S∩T = ∅
while each ul(·) is strictly increasing, rewriting (36) and (37) as(
u1(a
S
1 ) + . . .+ u1(a
S
|S|)
) · · · (uk(aS1 ) + . . .+ uk(aS|S|))
< (38)(
u1(a
S
1 )+. . .+u1(a
S
|S|)+u1(a
T
1 )+. . .+u1(a
T
|T |)
) · · · (uk(aS1 )+. . .+uk(aS|S|)+uk(aT1 )+. . .+ul(aT|T |))
and (
u1(a
T
1 ) + . . .+ u1(a
T
|T |)
) · · · (uk(aT1 ) + . . .+ uk(aT|T |))
< (39)(
u1(a
S
1 )+. . .+u1(a
S
|S|)+u1(a
T
1 )+. . .+u1(a
T
|T |)
) · · · (uk(aS1 )+. . .+uk(aS|S|)+uk(aT1 )+. . .+ul(aT|T |))
makes it obvious that (36) and (37) hold because each expanded product term on the left
hand side sum in (38) and (39) is also an expanded product term on the right hand side
sum, but not vice versa. In particular, (38) and (39) also clarify that
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈A
ul(a) ≥
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈S
ul(a) +
k∏
l=1
∑
a∈T
ul(a). (40)
Therefore, (35) and (40) hold with equality. Now take arbitrary a ∈ A\S and b ∈ A\T and
notice, for example, that the strictly positive term u1(a)u2(a) · · ·uk−1(a)uk(b) is included in∏k
l=1
∑
a∈A ul(a) but not in
∏k
l=1
∑
a∈S ul(a) +
∏k
l=1
∑
a∈T ul(a). This contradicts the postu-
lated equality.
2. Suppose first that k = 2 and define u : X → R++ by
u(a) := u1(a)u2(a),
and, for {a, b} ⊆ X, define D({a, b}) by
D({a, b}) := u1(a)u2(b) + u1(b)u2(a).
By definition,
ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) = u1(a)∑
b∈A
u1(b)
· u2(a)∑
b∈A
u2(b)
=
u(a)∑
b∈A
u(b) +
∑
a,b∈A
D({a, b}) =
u(a)∑
b∈A
u(b) +D(A)
,
where
D(A) :=
∑
a,b∈A
D({a, b}).
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Hence, D satisfies the additivity property (11).
Now suppose that k > 2 and assume to the contrary that there is a menu A such that
D(A) ≤
∑
a,b∈A
D({a, b}).
This implies
∑
a,b∈A
(
k∏
l=1
(ul(a) + ul(b))−
k∏
l=1
ul(a)−
k∏
l=1
ul(b)
)
≥
k∏
l=1
∑
b∈A
ul(b)−
∑
b∈A
k∏
l=1
ul(b)
which simplifies to
∑
a,b∈A
k∏
l=1
(ul(a) + ul(b)) ≥
k∏
l=1
∑
b∈A
ul(b)
Arguing in a similar fashion as in the proof of the first claim, and recalling that each ul(·) is
strictly positive, we conclude that this inequality is impossible.
3. Suppose a ∈ B ⊂ A and assume, per contra, that ρ(a,A ∪ {o}) ≥ ρ(a,B ∪ {o}). By (2),
this is equivalent to
k∏
l=1
ul(a)
k∏
l=1
∑
b∈A
ul(b)
≥
k∏
l=1
ul(a)
k∏
l=1
∑
b∈B
ul(b)
,
which implies
∏k
l=1
∑
b∈A ul(b) ≤
∏k
l=1
∑
b∈B ul(b). Since A ⊃ B and ul(·) is strictly positive
for all l ≤ k, this is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose a DC b, so that u(a) > u(b) and u(a) ≥ D({a, b}). By (8) and (9),
u(a) =
k∏
i=1
ui(a), u(b) =
k∏
i=1
ui(b),
D({a, b}) =
k∏
i=1
(
ui(a) + ui(b)
)− k∏
i=1
ui(a)−
k∏
i=1
ui(b). (41)
Suppose to the contrary that a 6MC b. This implies that there exists i ≤ k such that
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ui(b) > ui(a). Since u(a) ≥ D({a, b}) by assumption, we have
u1(a)u2(a) · · ·uk(a) ≥ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·uk−1(a)uk(b)
+ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·uk−1(b)uk(a)
...
...
+ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·ui(a)ui+1(b)ui+2(a) · · ·uk(a)
+ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·ui−1(a)ui(b)ui+1(a) · · ·uk(a)
+ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·ui−1(a)ui−1(b)ui(a) · · ·uk(a)
...
...
+ u1(a)u2(b)u3(a) · · ·uk(a)
+ u1(b)u2(a)u3(a) · · ·uk(a)
+ O(a, b),
where O(a, b) > 0 is the sum of the additional product terms in D({a, b}) that do not include
the ones written explicitly. Rearranging this expression and recalling that ui(a) < ui(b), we
have
u1(a)u2(a) · · ·ui−1(a)ui+1(a) · · ·uk(a)[ui(a)− ui(b)] ≥ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·uk−1(a)uk(b)
+ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·uk−1(b)uk(a)
...
...
+ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·ui(a)ui+1(b)ui+2(a) · · ·uk(a)
+ u1(a)u2(a) · · ·ui−1(a)ui−1(b)ui(a) · · ·uk(a)
...
...
+ u1(a)u2(b)u3(a) · · ·uk(a)
+ u1(b)u2(a)u3(a) · · ·uk(a)
+ O(a, b).
But given that uj(z) > 0 for all j ≤ k, z ∈ {a, b}, and since uj(a) < uj(b) holds by assump-
tion, the term on the left hand side is strictly negative while that on the right hand side
strictly positive, leading to a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
With the proof of Lemma 4 being immediate, it suffices to prove Lemmas 1 – 3.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Suppose to the contrary that there exist real numbers α1, . . . , αp, p ≤ m(|X|), and some
s ≤ m(|X|), such that
Es =
p∑
i=1
αiEi. (42)
From the definition of Ehh and Ehl, any two distinct matrices Es and Es′ in (21) have their
non-zero entries at distinct positions i, j in |X| × |X|. Therefore, (42) is impossible, and we
arrive at a contradiction. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.
First, upon noting the difference equation
m(|X|) = 3, if |X| = 2,
m(|X|) = |X|+m(|X| − 1), if |X| > 2,
and its general solution
m(|X|) = |X|
2 + |X|
2
,
it is readily seen that |X|2−m(|X|) > 0 is strictly increasing in |X|. Therefore, (22) consists
of m(|X|) equations in |X|2 > m(|X|) unknowns. Recalling now that ET is an m(|X|)×|X|2
matrix, we must show next that
rank(ET ) = rank(ET |D|X|), (43)
where ET |D|X| is the augmented m(|X|) × (|X|2 + 1) matrix that results when the vector
D|X| is inserted next to the last column of ET . To this end, notice first that |D||X|  0 by
assumption. Next, by construction of the matrices Ehh and Ehl, ET features m(|X|) < |X|2
rows that consist of 0 − 1 vectors in which the unique strictly positive entries appear in
m(|X|) distinct positions, and are therefore linearly independent. Hence, since |D||X|  0,
it follows that |D||X| is a linear combination of these m(|X|) rows, so that (43) holds. 
Proof of Lemma 3.
Suppose (21) is solvable, and recall that u1(xi), u2(xi) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , |X|. Given
this fact, and denoting by ri the i-th column of the matrix U that corresponds to the pos-
tulated solution, observe that for any distinct i, j ≤ |X| there exist real numbers αi, αj
such that αiri + αjrj = 0, thereby establishing that U is of rank 1. In particular, defining
αi :=
1
u2(xi)
and αj := − 1u2(xj) proves the assertion. The argument for the converse implica-
tion appears in the main text before the statement of the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 6.
1. Let ρ = (u,D) be a decision-conflict logit on X := {a, b} and assume that it also satisfies
CBS. The polynomial system (25) now reduces to u1(a)u2(a)u1(b)u2(b)
u1(a)u2(b) + u1(b)u2(a)
 =
 u(a)u(b)
D({a, b})

Normalizing u1(a) := 1, this system in turn reduces to
u1(a) = 1, u1(b) =
u(b)
u2(b)
,
u2(a) = u(a), u2(b) = D({a, b})− u1(b)u(a)
Solving for u1(b), u2(b) we get
u1(b) = κ
u2(b) = D({a, b})− κ,
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where
κ :=
D({a, b})± (D({a, b})2 − 4u(a)u(b)) 12
2u(a)
are the two solutions to the quadratic equation
u2(b) = D({a, b})− u(a)u(b)
u2(b)
(44)
that emerges from this system. Such solutions exist in the real line if and only if D({a, b})2−
4u(a)u(b) ≥ 0. Recalling now the relevant argument in the proof of Proposition 1, without
loss of generality we may write u(a) = ρ(a,{a,b,o})
ρ(b,{a,b,o}) , u(b) = 1 and D({a, b}) = ρ(o,{a,b,o})ρ(b,{a,b,o}) . It is
now easy to verify that the inequality above is satisfied if and only if the CBS condition (31)
holds.
We verify next that each of the two solutions –let us call them v̂ and v˜– is a joint ratio-scale
transformation of the other. Let τ :=
(
D({a, b})2 − 4u(a)u(b)) 12 . We have
v̂1(a) = 1, v˜1(a) = 1,
v̂1(b) =
D({a, b}) + τ
2u(a)
, v˜1(b) =
D({a, b})− τ
2u(a)
,
v̂2(a) = u(a), v˜2(a) = u(a),
v̂2(b) =
D({a, b})− τ
2
, v˜2(b) =
D({a, b}) + τ
2
.
Observe now that v̂1 = αv˜2 and v˜1 := αv̂2, where α :=
1
u(a)
> 0. The conclusion follows.
Finally, it remains to be verified that CBS holds with equality if and only if u1 = u2. But
this is obvious because CBS holds with equality if and only if the discriminant associated
with (44) is zero, which in turn is true if and only if there is a unique solution to (44).
2 ⇒ 1. Let (u1, u2) be a dual logit representation of ρ on X := {a, b}. We have
ρ(a, {a, b, o}) = u1(a)u2(a)
ω
ρ(b, {a, b, o}) = u1(b)u2(b)
ω
ρ(o, {a, b, o}) = u1(a)u2(b) + u1(b)u2(a)
ω
where ω := u1(a)u2(a) + u1(b)u2(b) + u1(a)u2(b) + u1(b)u2(a). Suppose to the contrary
that CBS is violated, so that ρ(o, {a, b, o})2 < 4ρ(a, {a, b, o})ρ(b, {a, b, o}). Given the above
equations, this implies
(
u1(a)u2(b) − u1(b)u2(a)
)2
< 0, which is a contradiction. It also
follows that setting u1 = u2 implies ρ(o, {a, b, o})2 = 4ρ(a, {a, b, o})ρ(b, {a, b, o}), hence that
CBS holds with equality. 
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